Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.027zbMath1455.92104OpenAlexW2146880028WikidataQ36762945 ScholiaQ36762945MaRDI QIDQ2219749

Martin A. Nowak, Drew Fudenberg, Lorens A. Imhof

Publication date: 21 January 2021

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2460568

zbMATH Keywords

finite populationprisoner's dilemmaevolutionary game dynamicsmutation-selection process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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