Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.014zbMath1337.91022OpenAlexW2119663273WikidataQ35947103 ScholiaQ35947103MaRDI QIDQ289489

Christina Pawlowitsch, Martin A. Nowak, David G. Rand, Michael L. Manapat

Publication date: 30 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc3348410

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryevolutionary dynamicsevolution of cooperationsocial dilemmasstochastic game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (11)

Evolution of cooperation in the traveler's dilemma game on two coupled lattices ⋮ General conditions for strategy abundance through a self-referential mechanism under weak selection ⋮ Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust ⋮ A note on the equilibria of the unbounded traveler's dilemma ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortative interactions ⋮ Egalitarian solutions to multiperson social dilemmas in populations ⋮ Dynamics of spatial traveler's dilemma games ⋮ A random world is a fair world ⋮ Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game ⋮ Metastability in stochastic replicator dynamics ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible

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