Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
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Publication:739686
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2014.06.041zbMATH Open1343.92363OpenAlexW3122552511WikidataQ50649412 ScholiaQ50649412MaRDI QIDQ739686FDOQ739686
Authors: Oliver P. Hauser, Martin A. Nowak, David G. Rand 
Publication date: 19 August 2016
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10871/33553
Recommendations
- Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
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- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)
Cites Work
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- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
- Direct reciprocity in structured populations
- Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
- Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game
- The evolution of coercive institutional punishment
- The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
- Lab experiments for the study of social-ecological systems
Cited In (19)
- Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata
- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
- The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network
- Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions
- Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration
- The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
- Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment
- Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information
- Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
- Multiple tolerances dilute the second order cooperative dilemma
- Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in ``noisy social exchange
- When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?
- Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
- Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
- In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
- Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation
- Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
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