Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dynamic model of social network formation
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- Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
- Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
- Lab experiments for the study of social-ecological systems
- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
- Positive interactions promote public cooperation
- Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
- Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma
- The calculus of selfishness.
- The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
- The evolution of coercive institutional punishment
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
Cited in
(19)- Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata
- Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
- Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
- The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network
- Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions
- Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration
- The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
- Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment
- Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information
- Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
- Multiple tolerances dilute the second order cooperative dilemma
- Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in ``noisy social exchange
- When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?
- Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
- Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
- In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
- Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
- Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation
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