Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.01.002zbMATH Open1290.91060OpenAlexW2058593513MaRDI QIDQ2442835FDOQ2442835

Authors: Yoshio Kamijo, T. Nihonsugi, Ai Takeuchi, Yukihiko Funaki 

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002

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zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsanctionlinear public goods gamepunishment institutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games

Cited In (17)

• Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Self-governance in generalized exchange. A laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment
• A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations
• Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
• Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game
• Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in ``noisy social exchange
• The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• Preordered service in contract enforcement
• Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation
• On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation
• In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
• Game theory and the evolution of cooperation

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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