Self-governance in generalized exchange. A laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment

DOI10.3390/G12020050MaRDI QIDQ2052555zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Georg Kanitsar

Publication date 26 November 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020050

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationembeddednessgeneralized exchangelaboratory experimentpeer punishmentsocial networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Review text

Summary: Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner's dilemma is arranged either in a public good structure or in a circular network of generalized exchange. The experimental results demonstrate that the merits of peer punishment do not extend to generalized exchange. In the public good, peer punishment was primarily altruistic, was sensitive to costs, and promoted cooperation. In generalized exchange, peer punishment was also altruistic and relatively frequent, but did not increase cooperation. While the dense punishment network underlying the public good facilitates norm enforcement, generalized exchange decreases control over norm violators and reduces the capacity of peer punishment. I conclude that generalized exchange systems require stronger forms of punishment to sustain social cooperation.

Recommendations

• In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
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• The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
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Cites work

• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments
• Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in ``noisy social exchange
• The evolution of cooperation

Cited in

(6)

• Selfish punishers. An experimental investigation of designated punishment behavior in public goods
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
• Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game
• On the design of peer punishment experiments
• In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments

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• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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