Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0zbMath1121.91328OpenAlexW2145380374MaRDI QIDQ2642888

Laurent Denant-Boemont, David Masclet, Charles N. Noussair

Publication date: 6 September 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0

zbMATH Keywords

Public goodsCounter punishment InformationSanction enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (20)

Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games ⋮ An introduction to the Symposium on behavioral game theory ⋮ Alleviation and sanctions in social dilemma games ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging ⋮ In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments ⋮ Inequality and inter-group conflicts: experimental evidence ⋮ The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors ⋮ Group selection: the quest for social preferences ⋮ Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment ⋮ Conditional punishment ⋮ The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action ⋮ Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments ⋮ Anger management: aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods ⋮ Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible ⋮ Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails ⋮ A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments ⋮ Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm ⋮ Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• On the design of peer punishment experiments
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions

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