Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.08.011MaRDI QIDQ2384430zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeffrey P. Carpenter

Publication date 21 September 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0206.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentgroup sizePublic goodspunishmentsimulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics

Cited in

(23)

• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
• Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes
• Belief heterogeneity and the restart effect in a public goods game
• Revisiting: ``The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups: continuous reciprocity in the repeated \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
• Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
• Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments
• Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games
• Effects of majority-vote reward mechanism on cooperation: a public good experimental study
• Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
• Explaining cooperative behavior in public goods games: how preferences and beliefs affect contribution levels
• Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
• Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
• When two become one: how group mergers affect solidarity
• Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism: an experimental investigation
• Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• The public goods game with a new form of shared reward
• Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game
• An experimental analysis of team production in networks
• Incorporating conditional morality into economic decisions
• On the design of peer punishment experiments
• What norms trigger punishment?
• Punishment, inequality, and welfare: a public good experiment

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