Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
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Publication:2052499
DOI10.3390/G12010017zbMATH Open1478.91016OpenAlexW3126163920MaRDI QIDQ2052499FDOQ2052499
Authors: Rocio Botta, Gerardo Blanco, Christian E. Schaerer 
Publication date: 26 November 2021
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010017
Recommendations
- Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
- The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
- Group rewarding can promote cooperation and save costs in public goods games
evolutionary game theoryLyapunov stabilityoptional public good gamerandom punishmentstability perturbation
Cites Work
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- The evolution of cooperation
- The dynamics of public goods
- Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
- Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games
Cited In (2)
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