Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games

DOI10.3390/G12010017MaRDI QIDQ2052499zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rocio Botta, Gerardo Blanco, Christian E. Schaerer

Publication date 26 November 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010017

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryLyapunov stabilityoptional public good gamerandom punishmentstability perturbation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Review text

Summary: Improving and maintaining cooperation are fundamental issues for any project to be time-persistent, and sanctioning free riders may be the most applied method to achieve it. However, the application of sanctions differs from one group (project or institution) to another. We propose an optional, public good game model where a randomly selected set of the free riders is punished. To this end, we introduce a parameter that establishes the portion of free riders sanctioned with the purpose to control the population state evolution in the game. This parameter modifies the phase portrait of the system, and we show that, when the parameter surpasses a threshold, the full cooperation equilibrium point becomes a stable global attractor. Hence, we demonstrate that the fractional approach improves cooperation while reducing the sanctioning cost.

Recommendations

• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• Group rewarding can promote cooperation and save costs in public goods games

Cites work

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• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games
• Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
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Cited in

(3)

• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games
• Optimal control of fractional punishment in optional public goods game

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