Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games

DOI10.3390/G12010017zbMath1478.91016OpenAlexW3126163920MaRDI QIDQ2052499

Gerardo Blanco, Rocio Botta, Christian E. Schaerer

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010017

zbMATH Keywords

Lyapunov stabilityevolutionary game theoryoptional public good gamerandom punishmentstability perturbation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
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• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
• The dynamics of public goods
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games

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