The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
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Publication:2962147
DOI10.1073/PNAS.1115219109zbMATH Open1355.91045OpenAlexW2071212584WikidataQ35709162 ScholiaQ35709162MaRDI QIDQ2962147FDOQ2962147
Authors: Tatsuya Sasaki, Ulf Dieckmann, Karl Sigmund, Åke Brännström 
Publication date: 16 February 2017
Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115219109
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Social choice (91B14) Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Cites Work
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- EFFECTS OF SPACE IN 2 × 2 GAMES
- On the design of peer punishment experiments
- The carrot vs. the stick in work team motivation
Cited In (35)
- Replicator dynamics of public goods games with global exclusion
- Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
- Pool-rewarding in \(N\)-person snowdrift game
- Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
- Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
- Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives
- Evolution of trust in the \(N\)-player trust game with the margin system
- A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations
- Asymmetric public goods game cooperation through pest control
- Voluntary vaccination dilemma with evolving psychological perceptions
- Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation
- Cost optimisation of individual-based institutional reward incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
- Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
- Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
- Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
- A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
- Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game
- Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
- Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
- The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
- Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
- Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas
- Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
- Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
- Using rewards reasonably: the effects of stratified-rewards in public goods game
- Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas
- Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
- Game theory and the evolution of cooperation
- Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
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