The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas

DOI10.1073/pnas.1115219109zbMath1355.91045OpenAlexW2071212584WikidataQ35709162 ScholiaQ35709162MaRDI QIDQ2962147

Ulf Dieckmann, Tatsuya Sasaki, Karl Sigmund, Åke Brännström

Publication date: 16 February 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115219109

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (30)

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas ⋮ Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment ⋮ Pool-rewarding in \(N\)-person snowdrift game ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment ⋮ Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games ⋮ Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games ⋮ Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game ⋮ Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory ⋮ Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions ⋮ Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging ⋮ Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations ⋮ Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation ⋮ Using rewards reasonably: the effects of stratified-rewards in public goods game ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation ⋮ Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game ⋮ Asymmetric public goods game cooperation through pest control ⋮ Voluntary vaccination dilemma with evolving psychological perceptions ⋮ Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies ⋮ Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games ⋮ Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators ⋮ Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation

Cites Work

• On the design of peer punishment experiments
• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• EFFECTS OF SPACE IN 2 × 2 GAMES
• The carrot vs. the stick in work team motivation

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