The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation

DOI10.1007/S13235-013-0094-7zbMATH Open1302.91025arXiv1302.6742OpenAlexW2072163408WikidataQ39614207 ScholiaQ39614207MaRDI QIDQ483904FDOQ483904

Authors: Tatsuya Sasaki 

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et al. (2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165-1169) considered optional participation as well as institutional incentives and described how the interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Here, we present a full classification of these evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large enough to cause the bi-stability of both cooperation and defection in cases in which participation in the public good game is compulsory, these penalties will ultimately result in cooperation if participation in the public good game is optional. The global stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional case contrasts strikingly with the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case. We also argue that optional participation is not so effective at improving cooperation under rewards.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1302.6742

Recommendations

• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by incentives
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
• Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives
• Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorysocial dilemmasequilibrium selectionpunishmentpublic good gamesrewards

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives
• Positive interactions promote public cooperation
• Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
• Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
• Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games
• The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game
• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• The evolution of coercive institutional punishment
• Network formation and social coordination
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors
• The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action

Cited In (14)

• Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives
• Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation
• Cost optimisation of individual-based institutional reward incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by incentives
• Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
• Contract theory for the evolution of cooperation: the right incentives attract the right partners
• Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
• Sticks and carrots: two incentive mechanisms supporting intra-group cooperation
• Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions

This page was built for publication: The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q483904)