The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation

DOI10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7zbMath1302.91025arXiv1302.6742OpenAlexW2072163408WikidataQ39614207 ScholiaQ39614207MaRDI QIDQ483904

Tatsuya Sasaki

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1302.6742

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionevolutionary game theorysocial dilemmaspunishmentpublic good gamesrewards

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Statistical physics of human cooperation ⋮ Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions ⋮ Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation

Cites Work

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