Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2010.12.043zbMATH Open1405.91041OpenAlexW1994836788WikidataQ47329578 ScholiaQ47329578MaRDI QIDQ1670693FDOQ1670693
Authors: Jorge Peña, Enea Pestelacci, André Berchtold, Marco Tomassini 
Publication date: 6 September 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.043
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evolutionary game theoryevolution of cooperationnon-uniform interaction ratesparticipation costsupstream reciprocity
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- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
- Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
- Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates
- Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
- A theory of group selection.
- SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND COOPERATION IN COMPLEX NETWORKS
- Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks
- Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks
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