Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2010.12.043MaRDI QIDQ1670693zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jorge Peña, Enea Pestelacci, André Berchtold, Marco Tomassini

Publication date 6 September 2018

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.043

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryevolution of cooperationnon-uniform interaction ratesparticipation costsupstream reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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• Direct reciprocity in structured populations

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• A theory of group selection.
• Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks
• SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND COOPERATION IN COMPLEX NETWORKS
• The Structure and Function of Complex Networks
• The calculus of selfishness.
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of cooperation
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks

Cited in

(3)

• Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks
• Costly participation and the evolution of cooperation in the repeated public goods game
• The evolution of generalized reciprocity in social interaction networks

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