The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3945939 (Why is no real title available?)
- Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
- The evolution of cooperation
Cited in
(47)- Reciprocal rewards promote the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Coveting neighbors' wisdom promotes cooperation in structured populations
- Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game
- The quantum ultimatum game
- The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
- Selfish punishment: altruism can be maintained by competition among cheaters
- Numerical and analytical study of evolution of indirect reciprocity
- Effects of defensive cooperation strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma
- Eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the presence of policing
- Simulation analysis using multi-agent systems for social norms
- Agent-based models in sociology
- The influence of human heterogeneity to information spreading
- Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection
- The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
- Persistent cooperators in nature
- Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
- Evolving cooperation
- Learning process in public goods games
- Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
- Perturbation expansions of multilocus fixation probabilities for frequency-dependent selection with applications to the Hill-Robertson effect and to the joint evolution of helping and punishment
- Effect of migration based on strategy and cost on the evolution of cooperation
- Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
- Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game
- Evolutionary selection of socially sensitive preferences in random matching environments
- Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- How inconsistency between attitude and behavior persists through cultural transmission
- Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
- NETWORK DEPENDENCE OF STRONG RECIPROCITY
- Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility
- Punishment strategies across societies: conventional wisdoms reconsidered
- Why is civil conflict path dependent? A cultural explanation
- Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: the impact of higher-order history
- Human uniqueness-self-interest and social cooperation
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Assortment and reciprocity mechanisms for promotion of cooperation in a model of multilevel selection
- The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in ``noisy social exchange
- The evolution of norms
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
- Cultural coevolution of norm adoption and enforcement when punishers are rewarded or non-punishers are punished
- Bribe and punishment: effects of signaling, gossiping, and bribery in public goods games
- Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
- Reward and punishment mechanism with weighting enhances cooperation in evolutionary games
- Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
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