The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2003.07.001zbMATH Open1105.92021OpenAlexW3123935201WikidataQ34279404 ScholiaQ34279404MaRDI QIDQ851330FDOQ851330

Authors: Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis 

Publication date: 20 November 2006

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001

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zbMATH Keywords

Altruistic punishmentHuman cooperationMulti-level selectionStrong reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The evolution of cooperation
• The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (47)

• Coveting neighbors' wisdom promotes cooperation in structured populations
• Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game
• The quantum ultimatum game
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• Selfish punishment: altruism can be maintained by competition among cheaters
• Numerical and analytical study of evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Effects of defensive cooperation strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma
• Agent-based models in sociology
• Eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the presence of policing
• The influence of human heterogeneity to information spreading
• Simulation analysis using multi-agent systems for social norms
• Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection
• The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
• Persistent cooperators in nature
• Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
• Evolving cooperation
• Learning process in public goods games
• Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
• Perturbation expansions of multilocus fixation probabilities for frequency-dependent selection with applications to the Hill-Robertson effect and to the joint evolution of helping and punishment
• Effect of migration based on strategy and cost on the evolution of cooperation
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game
• Evolutionary selection of socially sensitive preferences in random matching environments
• Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks
• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• NETWORK DEPENDENCE OF STRONG RECIPROCITY
• How inconsistency between attitude and behavior persists through cultural transmission
• Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
• Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility
• Punishment strategies across societies: conventional wisdoms reconsidered
• Why is civil conflict path dependent? A cultural explanation
• Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: the impact of higher-order history
• Human uniqueness-self-interest and social cooperation
• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• Assortment and reciprocity mechanisms for promotion of cooperation in a model of multilevel selection
• The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in ``noisy social exchange
• The evolution of norms
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
• Cultural coevolution of norm adoption and enforcement when punishers are rewarded or non-punishers are punished
• Bribe and punishment: effects of signaling, gossiping, and bribery in public goods games
• Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
• Reward and punishment mechanism with weighting enhances cooperation in evolutionary games
• Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
• Reciprocal rewards promote the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

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