The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations

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Publication:851330

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001zbMath1105.92021OpenAlexW3123935201WikidataQ34279404 ScholiaQ34279404MaRDI QIDQ851330

Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis

Publication date: 20 November 2006

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001




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