Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game

DOI10.1007/S10588-008-9053-ZzbMATH Open1175.91141OpenAlexW2047298720MaRDI QIDQ2272246FDOQ2272246

Authors: Shade T. Shutters 

Publication date: 6 August 2009

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-008-9053-z

Recommendations

• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
• The spatial ultimatum game revisited
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size
• The Social Ultimatum Game

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycooperationaltruismagent-based modelpunishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the design of peer punishment experiments

Cited In (4)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• CRITICAL BEHAVIOR IN AN EVOLUTIONARY ULTIMATUM GAME WITH SOCIAL STRUCTURE
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size

This page was built for publication: Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2272246)