Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game

DOI10.1007/S10588-008-9053-ZMaRDI QIDQ2272246zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shade T. Shutters

Publication date 6 August 2009

Published in Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-008-9053-z

zbMATH Keywords

agent-based modelaltruismcooperationgame theorypunishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Recommendations

• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 952981 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the design of peer punishment experiments
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations

Cited in

(5)

• Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131729 (Why is no real title available?)
• CRITICAL BEHAVIOR IN AN EVOLUTIONARY ULTIMATUM GAME WITH SOCIAL STRUCTURE
• Cooperation collapse in the harmony game: revisiting scodel and minas through evolutionary game theory
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations

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