The evolution of norms

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.11.028zbMath1447.92565OpenAlexW2040362916WikidataQ61908028 ScholiaQ61908028MaRDI QIDQ2199184

Francisco C. Santos, Fabio A. C. C. Chalub, Jorge M. Pacheco

Publication date: 16 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.11.028

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryevolution of cooperationmulti-level selectionindirect reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (18)

Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection ⋮ How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for \(2\times 2\) prisoner's dilemma game works for emerging cooperation ⋮ Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation ⋮ Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity ⋮ Two wrongs don't make a right: the initial viability of different assessment rules in the evolution of indirect reciprocity ⋮ Does information of how good or bad your neighbors are enhance cooperation in spatial prisoner's games? ⋮ Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory ⋮ Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups ⋮ Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas ⋮ A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation ⋮ The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity ⋮ Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ Simulation and NorMAS ⋮ Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity ⋮ Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in \(n\)-person games ⋮ The evolutionary advantage of limited network knowledge

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• Stochastic evolutionary dynamics on two levels
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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