Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.009MaRDI QIDQ536074zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ulrich Berger

Publication date 16 May 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://epub.wu.ac.at/3273/1/indirec_GEB_revised.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionprisoner's dilemmascoring ruleindirect reciprocityfirst-order information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
• Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54099 (Why is no real title available?)
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Social norms and random matching games
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation

Cited in

(19)

• The evolution of cooperation and diversity under integrated indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors
• Social dilemma based on reputation and successive behavior
• Evolving cooperation
• The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity
• Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy
• On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
• A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information
• A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
• Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
• Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
• Cooperation by indirect revelation through strategic behavior
• Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: the impact of higher-order history
• Density games
• Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
• Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions

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