Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.009zbMath1236.91032OpenAlexW2159489195MaRDI QIDQ536074

Ulrich Berger

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/3273/1/indirec_GEB_revised.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutioncooperationprisoner's dilemmascoring ruleindirect reciprocityfirst-order information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (13)

Evolving cooperation ⋮ Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information ⋮ Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas ⋮ Social dilemma based on reputation and successive behavior ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations ⋮ Density games ⋮ On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors ⋮ Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions

Cites Work

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• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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