Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy
DOI10.1080/00207721.2014.943821zbMATH Open1355.91007OpenAlexW2134235564MaRDI QIDQ5265577FDOQ5265577
Authors: Bo Chen, Bin Zhang, Huaqing Wu 
Publication date: 28 July 2015
Published in: International Journal of Systems Science. Principles and Applications of Systems and Integration (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207721.2014.943821
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Cites Work
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Combined trust model based on evidence theory in iterated prisoner's dilemma game
- The evolution of cooperation
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
- The Economics of Rumours
- Automata, repeated games and noise
- Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Networks of relations and word-of-mouth communication
- Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
- Rational behaviour and cooperation degree in competitive situations
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