Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
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Publication:1886747
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.004zbMath1099.91039OpenAlexW2071697652MaRDI QIDQ1886747
Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 19 November 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/3043107/guid-b00449bd-3726-4888-83f5-b1919047bcc6-ASSET1.0.pdf
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
- Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
- Incentives in Teams
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
