Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
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DOI10.2307/2298048zbMATH Open0719.90004OpenAlexW1972516783MaRDI QIDQ5752263FDOQ5752263
Authors: Lin Zhou 
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298048
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Cited In (33)
- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Social Choice Theory
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
- Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- An alternative proof of the Hurwicz (1972) impossibility theorem
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
- Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
- Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
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