On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
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Publication:839623
DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0358-0zbMATH Open1190.91054OpenAlexW2113215903MaRDI QIDQ839623FDOQ839623
Authors: Vera Zaporozhets, Michel Le Breton 
Publication date: 2 September 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1786/1/strategy_proofness.pdf
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Cites Work
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Cited In (23)
- Social Choice Theory
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Non-bossiness
- Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Circular domains
- Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
- Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Local vs. global strategy-proofness: a new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
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