Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
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Cites work
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637541 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters, and Simple Games
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Cited in
(57)- Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Voting under constraints
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Dictatorship on top-circular domains
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- A brief history of social choice and welfare theory
- John A. Weymark
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
- Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
- Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
- Strategy-proof voting scheme under single-peak preference
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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- Implementation theory
- Social Choice Theory
- A spatial analogue of May's theorem
- A spatial analogue of May's theorem
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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- Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
- Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
- Tops-only domains
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function
- Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
- Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Anonymous implementation
- Stochastic dominance strategyproofness and submodularity
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
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- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
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