scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637541
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Publication:4197570
zbMath0409.90006MaRDI QIDQ4197570
Hugo Sonnenschein, David Schmeidler
Publication date: 1978
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Social ChoicePreference AnalysisSocial Welfare FunctionsDictatorialIndependence of Irrevelant AlternativesManipulabilityStrategy Proofness
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