Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
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Publication:904838
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0887-2zbMath1341.91072OpenAlexW2063671129MaRDI QIDQ904838
Publication date: 14 January 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0887-2
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