Social aggregators

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0291-1MaRDI QIDQ1762844zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kfir Eliaz

Publication date 11 February 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0291-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Individual preferences (91B08) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(14)

• Abstract Arrowian aggregation
• A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory
• Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain
• Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
• Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
• Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
• Social Choice Theory
• On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness
• Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
• Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
• Bounded response of aggregated preferences
• Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
• About audience overlaps in the social media

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