Social aggregators
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Publication:1762844
DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0291-1zbMATH Open1083.91052OpenAlexW4231741191MaRDI QIDQ1762844FDOQ1762844
Authors: Kfir Eliaz 
Publication date: 11 February 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0291-1
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Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Individual preferences (91B08) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)
Cited In (14)
- Social Choice Theory
- On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness
- Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
- Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
- Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain
- Abstract Arrowian aggregation
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
- Bounded response of aggregated preferences
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- About audience overlaps in the social media
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
- Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
- A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory
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