A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2005.09.055zbMath1131.91019MaRDI QIDQ2493753

Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2005.09.055

zbMATH Keywords

simplicial complex; homology group; homomorphism; preference reversal; simplicial mapping

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

55U99: Applied homological algebra and category theory in algebraic topology

Related Items

A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem

Cites Work

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