Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules

DOI10.1007/S003550050066MaRDI QIDQ1367925zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors G. A. Koshevoy

Publication date 13 April 1998

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050066

zbMATH Keywords

nondictatorshipPareto propertystrong manipulator

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(16)

• What is responsible for the ``Paretian Epidemic
• Topological social choice
• On isotopic dictators and homological manipulators
• A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
• On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem
• A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory
• Non-dictatorial extensive social choice
• Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
• A characterization of the n-agent Pareto dominance relation
• Harmless Homotopic Dictators
• Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
• On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
• On the topological equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and Amartya Sen's liberal paradox
• A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem
• Manipulation of the Pareto semi-optimal rule

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