Harmless Homotopic Dictators

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_2MaRDI QIDQ5506527zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicholas Baigent

Publication date 28 January 2009

Published in Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• On isotopic dictators and homological manipulators
• Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules
• On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions
• A reformulation of Chichilnisky's impossibility theorem
• A note on continuous social choice

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
• Informational geometry of social choice
• Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective
• The topological equivalence of the Pareto condition and the existence of a dictator
• Topological social choice
• Two-person and majority continuous aggregation in 2-good space in social choice: A note

Cited in

(3)

• Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules
• On isotopic dictators and homological manipulators
• Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof

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