Informational geometry of social choice

DOI10.1007/S003550050061MaRDI QIDQ1367918zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald G. Saari

Publication date 13 April 1998

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050061

zbMATH Keywords

dictatorial behaviorelementary geometrypositional voting methodstopological result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Complexity and the geometry of voting
• Geometry, Voting, and Paradoxes
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Geometry of voting

Cited in

(8)

• Topological social choice
• Abstract aggregations and proximity preservation: an impossibility result
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
• Limiting dictatorial rules
• Harmless Homotopic Dictators
• The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences
• From decision problems to dethroned dictators

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