Limiting dictatorial rules
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Publication:2581795
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Cites work
- A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Anonymity in large societies
- Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
- Competition among institutions
- Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: a constructive proof
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1351867 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3304085 (Why is no real title available?)
- Informational geometry of social choice
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems
- On 64%-Majority Rule
- Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Social choice and individual values
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
Cited in
(8)- The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
- Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1163869 (Why is no real title available?)
- The Limit of the Non-dictatorship Index
- Only a dictatorship is efficient
- Intergenerational equity and infinite-population ethics: a survey
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