A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(77)90008-8zbMATH Open0367.90007OpenAlexW2076437317MaRDI QIDQ1242843FDOQ1242843

Authors: N. Schmitz 

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(77)90008-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• Extensions of measure
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (13)

• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's impossibility theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?)
• On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions
• Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
• Ultraproducts and aggregation
• A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities
• The categorical approach to social choice theory
• Anonymity in large societies
• Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
• Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences
• Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
• Limiting dictatorial rules

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