Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
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Publication:1136590
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(80)90021-XzbMath0427.90005OpenAlexW2015550751MaRDI QIDQ1136590
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(80)90021-x
social welfare functionsArrow's impossibility theoremBoolean algebra of measurable coalitionscontinuous preference profilesinvisible dictatorsmeasurable spaces of economic agentsnegligible coalitionssocial choices
Related Items (23)
Existence of nonatomic core-Walras allocations ⋮ Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions ⋮ Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras ⋮ Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population ⋮ Stable preference aggregation with infinite population ⋮ A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities ⋮ Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators ⋮ Games of bounded deviation, additivizations of games and asymptotic martingales ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's impossibility theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?) ⋮ Superset-robust collective choice rules ⋮ Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games ⋮ On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions ⋮ Anonymity in large societies ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures ⋮ The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population ⋮ Ultraproducts and aggregation ⋮ The core-Walras equivalence ⋮ Limiting dictatorial rules ⋮ Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
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