On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0030-XzbMATH Open1132.91417OpenAlexW2038184689MaRDI QIDQ2500706FDOQ2500706

Authors: Hannu Salonen, Kari Saukkonen 

Publication date: 18 August 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0030-x

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
• Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
• Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
• A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Some Properties of Topological Social Choice Functions
• Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras

Cited In (17)

• Kaplow-Shavell welfarism without continuity
• Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
• Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory
• Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
• Social evaluation functionals: a gateway to continuity in social choice
• Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
• Intergenerational equity and infinite-population ethics: a survey
• Quasi-stationary social welfare functions
• Continuity, Manifolds, and Arrow's Social Choice Problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
• Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
• Harmless Homotopic Dictators
• Little and Bergson on Arrow's concept of social welfare
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
• Reformulation of the Nash social welfare function for a continuum of individuals

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