On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions
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Publication:2500706
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Cites work
- A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
- Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Some Properties of Topological Social Choice Functions
Cited in
(17)- Kaplow-Shavell welfarism without continuity
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
- Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory
- Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
- Social evaluation functionals: a gateway to continuity in social choice
- Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
- Intergenerational equity and infinite-population ethics: a survey
- Quasi-stationary social welfare functions
- Continuity, Manifolds, and Arrow's Social Choice Problem
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3989041 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
- The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
- Harmless Homotopic Dictators
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- Little and Bergson on Arrow's concept of social welfare
- Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
- Reformulation of the Nash social welfare function for a continuum of individuals
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