Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00272-5MaRDI QIDQ6156331zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jac C. Heckelman

Publication date 13 June 2023

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5

zbMATH Keywords

social welfare functionscoring functionaxiomatic propertiesmajority loser

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
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• Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
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Cites work

• A Note on Preference Aggregation
• A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
• A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Qualified voting systems
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The greatest unhappiness of the least number
• The informational basis of scoring rules
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
• Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple

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