Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
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Publication:6156331
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Cites work
- A Note on Preference Aggregation
- A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
- A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Qualified voting systems
- Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- The informational basis of scoring rules
- The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
- Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple
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