The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0048-0MaRDI QIDQ2500712zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0048-0

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingminimal veto conditionscoring rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• A characterization of the plurality rule
• A complete characterization of majority rules
• Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
• Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity
• A dichotomy theorem for the inverse satisfiability problem
• A note on restricted majority rules: Invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness
• A Sound and Complete Axiomatization of Majority- Logic

Cites work

• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences

Cited in

(20)

• The socially acceptable scoring rule
• A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
• Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
• Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
• Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Qualified voting systems
• Robustness against inefficient manipulation
• Is majority consistency possible?
• Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
• The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
• A general scoring rule
• The greatest unhappiness of the least number
• The greatest unhappiness of the least number
• Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
• A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
• Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
• Progressive and robust scoring rules: axiomatic taxonomy
• Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
• The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule

This page was built for publication: The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2500712)