Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
This article introduces a condition of equal treatment of congruent distributions (ETCD) for social choice functions. This condition implies an equal treatment condition for individuals which is a weakening of anonymity, and an equal treatment condition for alternatives which is a weakening of neutrality. Two given preference profiles that share the same shape of the distribution of votes except for the names of alternatives and individuals are said to have congruent distributions. ETCD requires that, under two preference profiles having congruent distributions, the chosen alternatives should share the same number of votes. ETCD implies nondictatorship whenever the number of individuals is three or more. A class of social choice functions called the class of tie-breaking plurality (TBP) rules is studied. It is defined by the property of selecting a single alternative among the alternatives having the maximal votes whenever there are two or more such alternatives. The class of TBP rules is characterized by ETCD plus one of two types of positive responsiveness conditions. The first such condition is named monotonicity and is defined by: if an alternative chosen at a given preference profile becomes most preferred whereas the relative rank of other alternatives remains the same under a new preference of an individual, then the alternative should remain chosen at the new preference profile. The second condition characterizes the TBP class if the number of individuals is large enough. It is called weak monotonicity and requires that if an alternative chosen at a given preference profile becomes from second preferred to most preferred, whereas the relative rank of other alternatives remains the same under a new preference of an individual, then the alternative should remain chosen by the new preference profile. The study is developed under assumptions of fixed number of individuals and fixed number of alternatives.
- A characterization of the plurality rule
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Anonymous and neutral majority rules
- Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
- Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
- Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
- Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Rank-based choice correspondences
- Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
- Resolute majority rules
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences
- The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
This page was built for publication: Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2171850)
