Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-021-01382-3MaRDI QIDQ2171850zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hiroki Saitoh

Publication date 9 September 2022

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01382-3

zbMATH Keywords

social choicepreference profileplurality rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(5)

• A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
• Breaking ties in collective decision-making
• Role of the plurality rule in multiple choices
• On two choice rules similar to the plurality rule and Borda’s rule
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules

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