Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
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Publication:1245060
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90067-9zbMATH Open0374.90001OpenAlexW2082419013MaRDI QIDQ1245060FDOQ1245060
Authors: Peter Fishburn, William V. Gehrlein 
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90067-9
Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- INTERSECTION THEOREMS FOR SYSTEMS OF FINITE SETS
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- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- Formal Structure of Majority Decision
- On Collective Rationality and a Generalized Impossibility Theorem
- Social Choice Functions
Cited In (11)
- Resolute majority rules
- Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting
- Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules
- Partial information on decisional competences and the desirability of the expert rule in uncertain dichotomous choice situations
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- The network of weighted majority rules and weighted majority games
- Comparison of the polar decision rules for various types of distributions
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Simple majority voting isn't special
- Between the expert and majority rules
- Collective decision making in hierarchies
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