Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
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Cites work
- Formal Structure of Majority Decision
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- INTERSECTION THEOREMS FOR SYSTEMS OF FINITE SETS
- On Collective Rationality and a Generalized Impossibility Theorem
- Social choice and individual values
- Social Choice Functions
- The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
Cited in
(12)- Simple majority voting isn't special
- Collective decision making in hierarchies
- Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting
- The network of weighted majority rules and weighted majority games
- Comparison of the polar decision rules for various types of distributions
- Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- Between the expert and majority rules
- Resolute majority rules
- Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
- Partial information on decisional competences and the desirability of the expert rule in uncertain dichotomous choice situations
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