General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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Publication:5650180
DOI10.2307/2296870zbMath0239.90003OpenAlexW2167395705WikidataQ56936371 ScholiaQ56936371MaRDI QIDQ5650180
Andreu Mas-Colell, Hugo Sonnenschein
Publication date: 1972
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f66c6beda52f00373ca04509fd9ad27e6763055f
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