Oligarchies in spatial environments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.09.006zbMATH Open1179.91063OpenAlexW3022879908MaRDI QIDQ845604FDOQ845604

Ton Storcken, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 29 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/09-2007-cah.pdf

Recommendations

• Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments
• Social choice in economic environments
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zbMATH Keywords

oligarchiesspatial environments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• Social choice with analytic preferences
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Generalized median social welfare functions
• Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions

Cited In (1)

• Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

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