Oligarchies in spatial environments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.09.006MaRDI QIDQ845604zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken

Publication date 29 January 2010

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/09-2007-cah.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

oligarchiesspatial environments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments
• Social choice in economic environments
• Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Social choice with analytic preferences
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 509232 (Why is no real title available?)
• Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Generalized median social welfare functions
• Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions
• Social choice and individual values
• Social choice with analytic preferences

Cited in

(1)

• Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

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