Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
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Publication:1138980
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90012-7zbMath0432.90007OpenAlexW2046680136MaRDI QIDQ1138980
Robert A. Pollak, Douglas H. Blair
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90012-7
social choicegeneralizationdictatorshipArrow's impossibility theoremcollective rationalityrelaxation of conditions
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- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Social Decision Functions and the Veto
- Semiorders and the Theory of Choice
- Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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