Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
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Publication:2015027
DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9352-9zbMath1290.91056OpenAlexW2109579158MaRDI QIDQ2015027
Publication date: 18 June 2014
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9352-9
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Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship, Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population, Stable preference aggregation with infinite population, Collective choice rules with social maximality, When is weak Pareto equivalent to strong Pareto?, Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence, Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer, Preference aggregation and atoms in measures, The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population, Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
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