Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:2015027)
Recommendations
Cites work
- A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
- Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3326329 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
- Multi-profile intergenerational social choice
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
- Rationality, external norms, and the epistemic value of menus
- Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules
- Semiorders and collective choice
- Social choice and individual values
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Social Decision Functions and Strongly Decisive Sets
Cited in
(22)- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- A complete characterization of hierarchy
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
- Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
- Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
- Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
- Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
- The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- Collective choice rules with social maximality
- When is weak Pareto equivalent to strong Pareto?
- Domain conditions in social choice theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4213698 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082116 (Why is no real title available?)
- Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
- Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202054 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 970203 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the difficulty of combining actual and potential criteria for an increase in social welfare
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
This page was built for publication: Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2015027)
