Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
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Publication:2015027
DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9352-9zbMATH Open1290.91056OpenAlexW2109579158MaRDI QIDQ2015027FDOQ2015027
Authors: Susumu Cato 
Publication date: 18 June 2014
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9352-9
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Cited In (22)
- Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
- Collective choice rules with social maximality
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Domain conditions in social choice theory
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
- Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
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- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
- A complete characterization of hierarchy
- Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
- Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
- Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
- The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
- When is weak Pareto equivalent to strong Pareto?
- On the difficulty of combining actual and potential criteria for an increase in social welfare
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
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- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
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- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
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