Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
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Publication:500589
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.03.015zbMath1321.91035OpenAlexW2031896404MaRDI QIDQ500589
Publication date: 5 October 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.015
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Cites Work
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- Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
- Twitching weak dictators
- Weak independence and veto power.
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem
- Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- More on independent decisiveness and Arrow's theorem
- Internal Consistency of Choice
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