Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0591-9zbMATH Open1287.91067OpenAlexW2039918692MaRDI QIDQ2452144FDOQ2452144

Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa, Jun Iritani, Tomoyuki Kamo

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0591-9

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
• Acyclic choice and group veto

Cited In (5)

• Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
• Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
• Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
• Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
• The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population

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