Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.005zbMath1222.91016OpenAlexW2016776262MaRDI QIDQ553521

Biung-Ghi Ju

Publication date: 27 July 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicitymajority ruletransitivityvoting rulecollective rationalityquasi-transitivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting ⋮ Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cites Work

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