The Simple Majority Decision Rule
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5582110
DOI10.2307/1912796zbMath0188.24305OpenAlexW2006276175WikidataQ30048222 ScholiaQ30048222MaRDI QIDQ5582110
Publication date: 1969
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912796
Related Items (62)
Special majority rules. Necessary and sufficient condition for quasi- transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences ⋮ Single-peaked choice ⋮ Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby? ⋮ Single-plateaued choice ⋮ Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting ⋮ A preference aggregation method through the estimation of utility intervals ⋮ Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences ⋮ The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough ⋮ Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree ⋮ A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain ⋮ How Large are Transitive Simple Majority Domains? ⋮ Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions ⋮ A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains ⋮ Fuzzy aggregation in economic environments: I. Quantitative fuzziness, public goods and monotonicity assumptions. ⋮ A characterization of the single-peaked domain ⋮ Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains ⋮ Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice ⋮ Conditions on preferences that guarantee a simple majority winner† ⋮ On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences ⋮ The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet ⋮ The extended Condorcet condition: A necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of majority decision ⋮ Aggregation of preferences: a review ⋮ Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule ⋮ Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule ⋮ Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions ⋮ Single-peaked orders on a tree ⋮ Single-basined choice ⋮ A characterization of the single-crossing domain ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Simple majority rule and integer programming ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains ⋮ A new method for ranking fuzzy numbers and its application to group decision making ⋮ A necessary and sufficient single-profile condition for transitivity of the majority rule relation ⋮ On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions ⋮ On transitivity of the social preference relation under simple majority rule ⋮ Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences ⋮ Consistency and its converse for roommate markets ⋮ A general possibility theorem for group decision rules with Pareto- transitivity ⋮ Minimal conditions for monotonicity of capital value ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory ⋮ The launching of `social choice and welfare' and the creation of the `Society for Social Choice and Welfare' ⋮ Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making ⋮ Transitivity of preference on a smooth manifold of alternatives ⋮ On two sufficient conditions for transitivity of the social preference relation ⋮ Creating an acceptable consensus ranking for group decision making ⋮ Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules ⋮ Zero-sum condition: A necessary and sufficient condition for a transitive voting system ⋮ Preference exclusions for social rationality ⋮ A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions ⋮ Collective Choice for Simple Preferences ⋮ Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency ⋮ Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results ⋮ Preference ranking models: Conditions for equivalence ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey ⋮ On the existence of stable roommate matchings ⋮ Intrinsic Limitations of the Majority Rule, an Algorithmic Approach ⋮ NON-MANIPULABLE PARTITIONING
This page was built for publication: The Simple Majority Decision Rule
