A characterization of the single-crossing domain
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Publication:2453407
DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0717-8zbMath1288.91049OpenAlexW1964590038MaRDI QIDQ2453407
Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Gerhard J. Woeginger
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0717-8
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