A characterization of the single-peaked domain
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Publication:622583
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0476-3zbMath1232.91150OpenAlexW2077148218MaRDI QIDQ622583
Guillaume Haeringer, Miguel Ángel Ballester
Publication date: 3 February 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0476-3
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