Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
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Publication:2322697
Recommendations
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Cites work
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Bypassing combinatorial protections: polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- Computational aspects of nearly single-peaked electorates
- Control and bribery in voting
- Efficient algorithms for interval graphs and circular-arc graphs
- Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- More natural models of electoral control by partition
- Multimode control attacks on elections
- On the computation of fully proportional representation
- On the parameterized complexity of multiple-interval graph problems
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
- The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
Cited in
(8)- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
- Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6928629 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the parameterized complexity of party nominations
- On the complexity of constructive control under nearly single-peaked preferences
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
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