Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
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Publication:2322697
DOI10.1007/S00224-018-9843-8zbMATH Open1422.91227OpenAlexW2788181108MaRDI QIDQ2322697FDOQ2322697
Publication date: 5 September 2019
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-018-9843-8
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parameterized complexityCondorcetelection controlCopelandMaximinmulti-peaked electionsingle-peaked election
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Cited In (4)
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