Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
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Publication:3392309
DOI10.1002/malq.200810020zbMath1177.91065arXiv0806.0535MaRDI QIDQ3392309
Jörg Rothe, Gábor Erdélyi, Markus Nowak
Publication date: 14 August 2009
Published in: Mathematical Logic Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0806.0535
computational complexity; artificial intelligence; manipulability; computational social choice; preference aggregation; voting system; approval voting; procedural control
91B12: Voting theory
91B08: Individual preferences
68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control, Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election, Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems, Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting, Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control, Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
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