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Publication:3624050

zbMath1165.91362MaRDI QIDQ3624050

Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Ariel D. Procaccia

Publication date: 28 April 2009


Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.



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