Normalized range voting broadly resists control
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:385502)
Abstract: We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that performing that case of control is computationally infeasible. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter. We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control resistances among natural voting systems.
Recommendations
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- How hard is it to control an election?
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
- A smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Cited in
(10)- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
- A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
This page was built for publication: Normalized range voting broadly resists control
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q385502)
