Normalized range voting broadly resists control
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Publication:385502
DOI10.1007/s00224-012-9441-0zbMath1386.91063arXiv1005.5698MaRDI QIDQ385502
Publication date: 2 December 2013
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.5698
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