Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
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Publication:513294
DOI10.1007/s00453-015-0064-0zbMath1358.91048arXiv1501.00387OpenAlexW1698830886MaRDI QIDQ513294
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Ildikó Schlotter
Publication date: 6 March 2017
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.00387
Related Items (10)
The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections ⋮ On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets ⋮ Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting ⋮ How hard is safe bribery? ⋮ Local distance constrained bribery in voting ⋮ Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions ⋮ Approximation and hardness of shift-Bribery ⋮ Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model ⋮ Mixed integer programming with convex/concave constraints: fixed-parameter tractability and applications to multicovering and voting ⋮ Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules
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